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linjunctive Relief for Constitutional Violations: Does the Civil 
Service Reform Act Preclude Equitable Remedies? 
Elizabeth A. Wells 
The current structure of the civil service denies many federal em-
ployees the right to protest disciplinary action by a supervisor before 
an independent board of review. Under the remedial scheme estab-
lished by Congress, these individuals possess only the right to petition 
for a heru.ing; an employee using this procedure has no guarantee that 
the board will even investigate her case. The restrictions apply even to 
those instances where a civil servant claims the disciplinary action vio-
lated her constitutional rights. For federal employees denied the right 
to independent review, access to judicial remedies in federal district 
court appears necessary to protect their rights adequately. Recent 
court decisions, however, have foreclosed this avenue. 
In Bush v. Lucas, 1 the Supreme Court held that a federal employee 
had no judicial damages remedy for First Amendment violations by a 
superior. Following doctrine set forth in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 2 the Court ruled 
that the comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions created 
by Congress to govern the civil service precluded such a remedy.3 
Thus, Congress had the power to obviate money damages for constitu-
tional deprivations, and had chosen to preclude such relief in this par-
ticular instance. In so holding, the Bush Court indicated that the 
available statutory remedies were "constitutionally adequate"4 to re-
dress the alleged violation. The Court did not mention, however, how 
extensive statutory relief must be in order to satisfy the Constitution, 
or even whether any remedy was constitutionally required. Bush v. 
Lucas merely held that the civil service remedial scheme preempted 
judicial action in the immediate case. 5 
Several years later, Schweiker v. Chi/icky 6 attempted to answer the 
questions left open in Bush, suggesting that the adequacy or complete-
1. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
3. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368. 
4. 462 U.S. at 378 n.14. The Court also described such remedies as meaningful. 462 U.S. at 
368, 386. Others have used these two words interchangeably with the term effective. See, e.g., 
McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 606 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1987) 
(using effective instead of meaningful in discussing Bush's description of the remedies); Note, 
Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of a Constitutional Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1251, 1255 (1988). This Note will do so as well. 
5. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
6. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
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ness of alternative remedies was irrelevant.7 Noting that Congress is 
the body charged with evaluating the competing concerns8 - balanc-
ing individual rights of public employees against the efficient operation 
of the civil service - the Court found that congressional legislation 
preempted a judicial damages remedy, despite the failure of Congress 
to provide "complete relief."9 Left unanswered in both Chi/icky and 
Bush was whether these or other remedial procedures also preempt 
judicial power to provide equitable relief for constitutional violations. 
An examination of lower court decisions exploring this question 
reveals a division of authority .1° Courts declining to create a constitu-
tional remedy typically read Bush and Chi/icky broadly, interpreting 
these decisions to foreclose the creation of any judicial remedy where 
Congress has established a comprehensive remedial system.11 Courts 
recognizing the capacity of the judiciary to furnish a remedy rest their 
decisions on the traditional power of the courts to grant injunctive 
relief where demanded by equitable principles.12 In every case, the 
crucial question has been "Has Congress chosen to preempt judicial 
relief?" A justifiably better query might be "Can Congress preempt all 
judicial remedies for constitutional deprivations?" The answer to this 
question requires balancing "the interests of the [federal employee], as 
a citizen, [with] the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees." 13 
7. See 487 U.S. at 425, 429. 
8. 487 U.S. at 429. The Court apparently derived this power from the Constitution. It cited 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), a case which held that the Constitution does 
not empower the Court to second-guess certain determinations by state officials. 
9. 487 U.S. at 425. The Court did note that the available remedies and safeguards were 
"meaningful," 487 U.S. at 425, but subsequent lower court decisions interpreting Chi/icky sug-
gest this finding was irrelevant. See, e.g., Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 1991) 
("[T]he key consideration is not whether a complete statutory remedy exists for the constitu-
tional violation charged."); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane) 
(Spagnola II) (arguing that in Chi/icky the Court made clear that "it is the comprehensiveness of 
the statutory scheme involved, not the 'adequacy' of specific remedies extended thereunder, that 
counsels judicial abstention") (emphasis added). 
10. Compare Spagnola IL 859 F.2d at 229-30 (permitting action for civil servants' constitu- · 
tional claims for equitable reliet) and Perry v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 484, 484-85 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(same) with Saul, 928 F.2d at 843 (denying equitable cause of action) and Lombardi v. Small 
Business Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 961-62 (10th Cir. 1989) (same) and Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 
909-12 (4th Cir. 1984) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). The Fourth Circuit expressed 
concern with its decision in Pinarin Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1991), but declined 
to reconsider the decision at that time. See infra note 74. Courts agree that federal courts should 
not have jurisdiction over nonconstitutional claims arising within the civil service. See, e.g., 
Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
11. See, e.g., Saul, 928 F.2d at 835-40, 843. But cf. Pinar, 747 F.2d at 912 (permitting pre-
clusion of judicially created remedies where "the available statutory remedies are constitutionally 
adequate to provide relief"). 
12. Spagnola IL 859 F.2d at 229-30; Perry, 849 F.2d at 484-85. 
13. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Pickering addressed the rights of 
state employees, but the test adopted by the court is highly relevant in the federal context as well. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that the task of striking this balance is best left to 
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This Note argues that the federal courts retain power to furnish 
equitable relief for constitutional violations to ensure adequate protec-
tion of federal employees' rights. Statutory procedures and remedies 
available under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA)14 and 
related legislation should preempt judicially created equitable relief 
only where the government or federal agency affirmatively demon-
strates that these procedures are constitutionally sufficient. Part I can-
vasses the current lower court response to the question of preclusion 
and notes the various routes taken by the courts in inferring congres-
sional intent to preempt. This Part discusses varying interpretations 
of the Civil Service Reform Act, the comprehensive legislation which 
some courts have recently held evinces Congress' intent to preclude 
judicially created remedies. Part II charts the organization and proce-
dural scheme of the civil service under the Act, calling attention to 
weaknesses in the statute which have hindered achievement of its 
objectives. Finally, Part III focuses on the judiciary's role in safe-
guarding constitutional guarantees. The discussion highlights the 
traditional role injunctive relief has played in implementing constitu-
tional protections. This Note concludes that judicially created equita-
ble relief for constitutional deprivations promotes efficient operation of 
the civil service and, more importantly, ensures adequate protection of 
federal employees' constitutional rights. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Civil servants who allege that a supervisor has wrongly disciplined 
them have several methods to contest the adverse action. Intra-agency 
review procedures15 and an external appeals body, the Merit Systems 
Protection Board, 16 handle many allegations of improper discipline. 
Specific classes of federal employees may also employ further mecha-
nisms to protest adverse actions, such as union grievance procedures 
or petitions alleging unfair labor practices.t7 
Several categories of federal employees, however, have no right to 
external review of a federal agency's disciplinary action. 18 For exam-
ple, a probationary employee who claims she was terminated for at-
tending a political demonstration which did not interfere with her 
Congress. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423-25; Bush, 462 U.S. at 389. Where a case involves 
constitutional rights, however, courts themselves may have to weigh the competing concerns and 
provide relief where necessary. See infra notes 169-96 and accompanying text. 
14. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 
28, 31, 38, 39, and 42 U.S.C. (1988)). 
15. Federal agencies established such internal administrative appeals systems pursuant to 
Exec. Order No. 10,987, 3 C.F.R. 519 (Comp. 1959-1963) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3 
C.F.R. 876 (Comp. 1971-1975)). Most such internal procedures remain. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 103-22. 
17. See infra note 109. 
18. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
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work has no guarantee that someone outside the particular agency will 
review the adverse action. Similarly, a civil servant who alleges he was 
denied a promotion for refusing to sign a petition at work has no right 
to independent review. 19 Such employees, perceiving the civil service 
remedial scheme to be unfair and ineffective, may elect to contest the 
disciplinary action through a civil suit in federal district court. With-
out court intervention in these cases, the employees' First Amendment 
rights to freedom of assembly and speech may go undefended. 
Despite gaps in employee protection under the civil service reme-
dial scheme and the fact that a suit in federal court is the only method 
of independent review for many employees, numerous courts have in-
terpreted the remedial system to preclude judicial remedies for consti-
tutional deprivations. This Part discusses the response of the courts to 
the question of preclusion. Section I.A examines the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bush that denied civil servants who allege constitutional 
violations by their superiors a judicial damages remedy. Following 
this decision, courts have refused to provide judicial remedies where 
Congress demonstrates intent to preclude. Section I.B discusses how 
courts have interpreted the Civil Service Reform Act to evince con-
gressional intent to preempt judicial relief. 
A. Preclusion of a Judicial Damages Remedy 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics 20 created a judicial damages remedy for deprivations of con-
stitutional rights by federal officials. There, the Supreme Court held 
that a violation of the Fourth Amendment's command against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by a federal agent acting under color of 
federal authority gave rise to a federal cause of action for damages. 21 
As the Supreme Court later clarified, the right to bring suit existed 
"despite the absence of a statute conferring such a right."22 Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions have extended the Bivens holding to 
remedy violations by federal officials of Eighth Amendment rights23 
19. See infra notes 128-53 and accompanying text; accord Spagnola v. Mathis (Spagnola I), 
809 F.2d 16, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en bane) (employee plaintiff claimed he was denied a pro-
motion for criticizing mismanagement within federal agency), revd. on other grounds on rehg., 
859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
20. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
21. 403 U.S. at 389. The suit stemmed from Bivens' arrest for alleged narcotics violations. 
Narcotics officers entered plaintiff's home violently, placed him under arrest, and searched his 
apartment. The officers then took plaintiff to a federal courthouse where he was interrogated and 
stripsearched before being released. 403 U.S. at 389. No charges were filed. Bivens brought suit 
in federal district court, alleging that the agents had acted without a warrant in arresting him and 
searching his apartment, that unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest, and that 
the arrest had been without probable cause. 403 U.S. at 389. 
22. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980). 
23. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17. 
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and due process guarantees under the Fifth Amendment.24 
The basis for the Bivens cause of action was fairly simple: rights 
require remedies. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan noted, 
"[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the 
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their reme-
dies so as to grant the necessary relief."25 When the government in-
vades constitutional rights, "federal courts may use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong done."26 
Central to the decision was the absence of two elements which the 
Court indicated would preempt judicial recognition of a federal cause 
of action. First, no "special factors counselling hesitation in the ab-
sence of affirmative action by Congress" existed.27 Second, the Court 
found lacking an "explicit congressional declaration that persons in-
jured by a federal officer's violation of [constitutional rights] may not 
recover money damages but must instead be remitted to another rem-
edy, equally effective in the view of Congress."28 Thus, under the 
principles of Bivens, the Supreme Court has specified two instances 
which defeat a constitutional cause of action: (1) where the defendant 
demonstrates the presence of "special factors," suggesting the court 
should decline to intervene even though Congress has not taken af-
24. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). Lower federal courts have further recognized 
Bivens suits for violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION§ 9.1.2, at 456 & nn.31-36 (1989) 
(collecting cases). Even if a Bivens cause of action for money damages is recognized, sovereign 
immunity may operate as a defense. Id. § 9.1.1, at 452. Most civil service officials cannot claim 
they are absolutely immune from suit; rather, they likely can assert "qualified immunity." See id. 
§§ 8.6.2.-6.3. To successfully argue qualified immunity, federal officials must demonstrate they 
acted in good faith. The Supreme Court has held that an officer acts in good faith when she does 
not negligently violate the Constitution or statutory law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."), Sovereign im-
munity is not a defense where the suit is for injunctive remedies. See infra note 168; see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 8.6.2, at 409, 411. 
25. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). Bell involved a 
claim highly similar to that in Bivens. Bell had brought suit in federal district court to recover 
damages for violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by FBI agents, alleging illegal 
arrest, false imprisonment, and illegal search and seizure of property. The Court's opinion recog-
nized that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear such claims, as they arose under the Constitu-
tion, 327 U.S. at 681-82, but declined to decide whether a cause of action for damages premised 
on constitutional provisions existed. 327 U.S. at 683-85. 
26. 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell. 327 U.S. at 684). 
27. 403 U.S. at 396. Such special factors included "federal fiscal policy," at issue in United 
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). There, the Court denied recovery for the gov-
ernment when a soldier was injured through defendant's negligence, finding that it was for Con-
gress, not the judiciary, to make new laws concerning the right of the government to recover for 
the loss of a soldier's services. 332 U.S. at 314; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. The special 
nature of the military has also served as a factor counseling hesitation. See, e.g., United States v. 
Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
28. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
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firmative action,29 or (2) where the "defendant[] show[s] that Con-
gress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared 
to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and 
viewed as equally effective."30 
Bush v. Lucas31 applied this analysis to the civil service arena. In 
Bush, the plaintiff's supervisors at a NASA facility had demoted him 
for publicly criticizing the agency. While his administrative appeal of 
that disciplinary action was pending, Bush brought suit in federal 
court for defamation and violation of his First Amendment rights. 32 
The Supreme Court found Bush to be without a judicial damages rem-
edy for constitutional deprivations by a superior. 33 In effect, the im-
plied cause of action was defeated "[b]ecause such claims arise out of 
an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive proce-
dural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against 
the United States."34 In so holding, the Court explicitly assumed that 
a constitutional deprivation had occurred, and that available civil ser-
vice remedies were less effective than a judicial damages remedy. The 
Court further noted that the statutory relief did not fully compensate 
the injured employee. 35 The question for the Court was "whether an 
elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with 
careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be aug-
mented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional 
violation at issue."36 Noting that Congress was better positioned to 
evaluate the impact of such new litigation on the efficiency of the civil 
service, the Court declined to authorize a cause of action. 37 
The reasoning behind this decision is somewhat clouded. Finding 
that the remedial provisions of the civil service did not "substitute" for 
a Bivens action, the Court declined to hold that this case fell under the 
alternative remedy exception. 38 Rather, the majority premised its de-
nial of a damage remedy on the "special factors" exception. 39 The 
Court did not explain what constituted these "special factors,"40 but 
29. See 403 U.S. at 396; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979). 
30. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19; see Davis, 442 U.S. at 246-47; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
31. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
32. 462 U.S. at 369-71. Subsequent to filing, the Civil Service Commission's Appeal Review 
Board (which handled such appeals prior to the passage of the CSRA) found that NASA's ac-
tions were not justified. NASA eventually reinstated Bush and agreed to provide backpay. 462 
U.S. at 369-71. 
33. 462 U.S. at 368. 
34. 462 U.S. at 368. 
35. 462 U.S. at 372. 
36. 462 U.S. at 388. 
37. 462 U.S. at 389-90. 
38. 462 U.S. at 378. 
39. See 462 U.S. at 385-88; Note, supra note 4, at 1255. 
40. Note, supra note 4, at 1256 & n.29. 
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apparently the very existence of constitutionally adequate alternative 
remedies was conclusive.41 Congress was not required to expressly de-
clare that the administrative alternative effectively substituted for a 
Bivens suit. In the Court's view, the statutory remedies themselves 
constituted "special factors counselling hesitation" under Bivens.42 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Bush Court apparently lifted the "special 
factor" exception out of its context. The exception impliedly applies 
only "in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Here, in cre-
ating alternative remedies for certain classes of federal employees, 
Congress has clearly taken "affirmative action."43 
B. Congressional Intent 
Much of the case law addressing the availability of judicial reme-
dies for federal employees has focused on congressional intent. At is-
sue is whether Congress, in legislating the civil service remedial 
scheme, intended to preclude a federal cause of action. This section 
examines the various approaches taken by the circuit courts in dis-
cerning congressional intent under the rationales of Bivens and Bush. 
The Supreme Court has required "clear and convincing evidence" 
of legislative intent to preempt judicial review before restricting court 
access to aggrieved parties.44 The Court recently reaffirmed this man-
date, noting that "where Congress intends to preclude judicial review 
of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear. "45 This 
heightened evidentiary burden stems from the Court's desire to avoid 
the "serious constitutional question" that would arise if a tribunal in-
terpreted a federal statute to foreclose judicial remedies for constitu-
tional deprivations.46 Adhering to this tradition, Bivens required that 
Congress explicitly declare an alternative remedy to be a substitute and 
view such statutory relief to be as effective as a judicial remedy.47 
Bush v. Lucas suggested a lesser standard: "When Congress provides 
an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by statu-
tory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the stat-
utory remedy itself, that the courts' power should not be exercised."48 
41. 462 U.S. at 385-88. 
42. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; see also Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 
1328, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1514 (1992); Note, supra note 4, at 1256. 
43. With this holding, the Bush Court also effectively blurred the line between the two excep-
tions set forth in Bivens, holding that an "alternative remedy" could be a "special factor." See 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, § 9.1.3, at 458; Note, supra note 4, at 1256; supra notes 27-30 and 
accompanying text. 
44. Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 
380 (1962)), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
45. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citing Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) 
and Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)). 
46. 486 U.S. at 603 (quoting Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975)). 
47. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). 
48. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378. 
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Responding to this apparently conflicting precedent, courts have 
adopted three distinct tests for "clear" evidence of congressional intent 
to preempt judicial relief. This section discusses each of these tests. 
Section I.B.1 addresses the first test, adopted by courts which, follow-
ing Bivens, require an explicit statement from Congress before they 
will refuse the cause of action. Other courts have extended the Bush 
rationale to preclude claims for equitable relief in addition to damage 
remedies. These tribunals rest their conclusions on propositions ex-
amined separately in sections I.B.2 and I.B.3. Section I.B.2 canvasses 
the jurisdictions which find an alternative remedy preempts judicial 
remedies where it provides meanit.J.gful relief. Thus, the second test for 
"clear" evidence of congressional intent to preclude is met where the 
relief is "meaningful." The third standard, discussed in section I.B.3, 
is based on the second rationale for the Bush decision. This rationale 
for Bush asserts that these remedies are preempted because Congress, 
not the courts, has the responsibility to weigh the competing concerns 
and furnish appropriate relief. 49 
1. The Explicit Statement Requirement 
Traditionally, courts have required an explicit statement of Con-
gress' intent to preempt judicial intervention before declining to rem-
edy constitutional violations. 5° Courts normally adopt such an 
approach when constitutional rights are at stake,51 or when seeking to 
avoid addressing constitutional questions. 52 Early decisions under the 
Civil Service Reform Act adhered to this view.53 Under this theory, 
mere failure to act or specifically speak to the issue was not enough, 
for "silence is far from 'the clearly discernible will of Congress.' " 54 
Effectively, courts subscribing to this approach do not view creation of 
49. This schism stems from the fact that the Bush decision effectively rests on two founda· 
tions. Note, supra note 4, at 1256. First, the Court found that the decision whether to grant 
jurisdiction was best left to Congress, which was in a better position to discern if "the public 
interest would be served" by such action. 462 U.S. at 390; see also supra text accompanying note 
37. Second, the Court found that the alternative civil service remedies were "clearly constitu· 
tionally adequate." 462 U.S. at 378 n.14; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-43. How-
ever, the Court explicitly left open the question whether the Constitution requires a 
"meaningful" remedy. 462 U.S. at 378 n.14. 
50. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 
(1979); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. 
51. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (requiring Congress to state clearly 
intent to give Secretary of State full discretion to withhold passports, as right to travel is pro-
tected by Constitution). 
52. See, e.g., Kent, 351 U.S. at 129-30 (not reaching question whether Congress could dele-
gate such discretion constitutionally). 
53. See, e.g., Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Borrell v. United States 
Intl. Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 
904, 907 (7th Cir. 1981). 
54. Davis, 442 U.S. at 247 (quoting Davis v. Passman;571 F.2d 793, 800 (4th Cir. 1978)); see 
also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20 (noting that "Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when 
it means to make the [Federal To1t Claims Act] an exclusive remedy"). But cf Borrell, 682 F.2d 
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a statutory remedy as necessarily displacing judicial remedies for con-
stitutional deprivations. Congress must explicitly state its intent to 
foreclose relief otherwise available in federal district court.ss Such a 
statement does not require the recitation of any "magic words,,, but 
merely a clear indication by Congress that it intends the statutory 
remedy to replace rather than complement the judicial remedy.s6 
When the claim is for equitable relief, courts more stringently em-
phasize the explicit statement requirement. Following Bush v. Lu-
cas, s7 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia conceded en 
bane in Spagnola v. Mathis (Spagnola II) ss that the remedial proce-
dures created by the CSRA preempted a Bivens suit. s9 The court in-
sisted, however, that federal courts retained the power to remedy 
constitutional deprivations with injunctions. "[T]ime and again this 
court has affirmed the right of civil servants to seek equitable relief 
against their supervisors, and the agency itself, in vindication of their 
constitutional rights.,,60 Spagnola II resolved two conflicting decisions 
which separate panels of the Circuit had issued on the same day in 
1986: Spagnola v. Mathis (Spagnola I) 61 and Hubbard v. EPA. 62 Both 
cases involved federal employees who claimed they were denied em-
ployment opportunities in violation of their First Amendment rights 
because they "blew the whistle,, on improper activity within the fed-
eral government. Spagnola asserted he was refused a promotion due 
to his criticism of agency mismanagement, 63 while Hubbard, a detec-
tive with the District of Columbia Police Department, claimed he was 
at 989-90 (implying that an adequate substitute for a judicial remedy might constitute a state-
ment from Congress of intent to preclude); infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. 
55. See Cutts, 692 F.2d at 140; cf. Borrell, 682 F.2d at 989-91 (inferring that Congress in-
tended for the CSRA to provide additional remedies for the protection of federal whistleblowers, 
not the sole remedy). 
56. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 n.5. Davis suggests that "a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of [an] issue to a coordinate political department" should exist, otherwise the court 
will presume power to enforce constitutional rights. Davis, 442 U.S. at 242 (quoting Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
57. 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
58. 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
59. 859 F.2d at 226-29. 
60. 859 F.2d at 229-30; see also Perry v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 484 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
the CSRA does not deprive federal courts of their traditional injunctive powers to protect consti-
tutional rights). But see Arakawa v. Reagan, 666 F. Supp. 254, 259 n.8 (noting that reading Bush 
to preclude only actions for damages was far too narrow; such a conclusion does not square with 
the reasoning behind Bush, which was "deference to the legislature's choice of a remedial 
scheme"). 
61. 809 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Spagnola I held that federal employees retained the right 
to Bivens damages after Bush when available civil service procedures were inadequate to redress 
the constitutional violation. 809 F.2d at 19-28. 
62. 809 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1986). Hubbard found that Bush precluded a damage action, 
despite the fact that Hubbard had access to the same civil service remedies as did Spagnola. 809 
F.2d at 8-11. 
63. Spagnola l 809 F.2d at 17-18. 
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denied a position with the EPA because he had made statements to the 
press about an investigation into narcotics use by members of Con-
gress. 64 The CSRA did not guarantee either individual an independ-
ent hearing or judicial review of the employment decisions. The court 
eventually held that despite the fact plaintiffs could not assert a Bivens 
claim for damages after Bush, they retained the right to seek injunctive 
relief. 65 Although the Circuit provided no further discussion on this 
issue at the time, support had appeared two years earlier in Hubbard: 
The court's power to impose equitable remedies against agencies is 
broader than its power to impose legal remedies against individuals. Biv-
ens actions are a recent judicial creation and comparatively easy for Con-
gress to preempt. The court's power to enjoin unconstitutional acts by 
the government, however, is inherent in the Constitution itself. 
Although Congress may limit this power, CSRA did not explicitly limit 
our jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional personnel actions by federal 
agencies. 66 
Thus, courts requiring an explicit statement by Congress before they 
will decline the constitutional cause of action for equitable relief have 
not found such language within the CSRA. 67 Provision of alternative 
relief precludes a judicial damage remedy, but not injunctive relief. 
2. Existence of Meaningful Remedies 
Courts have also inferred congressional intent to obviate judicial 
action from the completeness of the statutory remedies themselves. 
Interpreting the decision in Bush v. Lucas to rest on the constitutional 
adequacy of the available remedies, 68 forums adopting this method 
have required that statutory relief be meaningful in the particular in-
stance to preempt judicially created remedies. In effect, provision of 
effective remedies evinces congressional intent to forestall judicial 
intervention. 
The existence of effective procedures was conclusive in Pinar v. 
Dole. 69 There, the Fourth Circuit refused a Bivens suit, finding the 
plaintiff "was afforded constitutionally adequate procedures to protect 
64. Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 2-3. 
65. Spagnola II, 859 F.2d at 229-30. 
66. 809 F.2d at 11 n.15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The use of the word "jurisdic-
tion" represents the confusion on this issue that has plagued many courts. See, e.g., Lombardi v. 
Small Business Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 960 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding dismissal of Bivens action 
for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction"). Federal courts clearly have jurisdiction to hear consti-
tutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988); the question is whether they have the power to 
remedy a constitutional deprivation. 
67. See Spagnola ll 859 F.2d at 229-30; Perry v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 484, 484-85 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
68. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) ("[A] different case would be presented if Congress had not created a comprehensive 
scheme that was specifically designed to provide full compensation to civil service employees who 
are discharged or disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights."). 
69. 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985). 
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his first amendment rights."70 Pinar was a Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration police officer employed at Washington,s National Airport. He 
brought suit contending that several personnel actions taken against 
him, including a brief suspension and termination of a temporary pro-
motion, violated his First Amendment rights because they were in part 
due to his criticism of a superior.71 The court found that the FAA,s 
internal grievance procedures and the limited remedies under the 
CSRA afforded Pinar "comprehensive and constitutionally adequate" 
relief. 72 The court concluded that "where the personnel actions are so 
minor in nature and where the available statutory remedies are consti-
tutionally adequate to provide relief, Congress intended that judicially 
created remedies in district court not be made available."73 The deci-
sion held that ''judicially created remedies,, included equitable relief. 74 
Central to such preclusion is that statutory procedures at least pro-
vide some remedy.75 Courts apparently view the existence of a remedy 
as indicative of congressional intent to regulate that aspect of the gov-
ernment/ employee relationship, and thus to preclude judicial inter-
vention. 76 This requirement of a statutory remedy derives from a 
literal interpretation of the second Bivens exception: no judicial dam-
ages remedy remains where" 'an alternative remedy which [Congress] 
explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the 
70. 747 F.2d at 908. 
71. 747 F.2d at 902-03. 
72. 747 F.2d at 905. 
73. 747 F.2d at 912; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 30 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (opposing a Bivens remedy because the Federal Tort Claims Act provides "adequate" reliel); 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 651 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. La. 1987) (holding that 
the CSRA does not preempt judicial remedies for constitutional deprivations where it does not 
provide adequate reliel). 
74. Pinar, 747 F.2d at 909-12. In Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1991), the 
Fourth Circuit expressed some difficulty with Pinar following the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). Webster required clear congressional intent to preclude 
judicial remedies for constitutional deprivations. 486 U.S. at 603; see supra text accompanying 
notes 44-47. The facts of Bryant are worth noting simply because they are so humorous. Bry-
ant, a civilian employed by the Army News Service, sought declaratory and injunctive relief for 
critical evaluations by his supervisors. He claimed a 1985 job performance evaluation, rating his 
performance "unsatisfactory," was in retaliation for "his attempts to expose an alleged govern-
ment coverup of visits by unidentified flying objects (UFOs)." 924 F.2d at 526. Bryant had filed 
a "Writ of Habeas Corpus Extraterrestrial" in 1983 to compel the Air Force to produce the 
bodies of space creatures he claimed the military had recovered from crashed UFOs. That suit 
was eventually dismissed. 924 F.2d at 526. Although finding that Webster was not controlling, 
the Court of Appeals noted that "the Supreme Court at least suggest[s] that Webster's admoni-
tions might have relevance. On remand, the district court held that the CSRA contains no clear 
language expressing congressional intent to preclude judicial review of equitable constitutional 
claims by federal employees arising from adverse personnel actions." 924 F.2d at 528. Despite 
the clear conflict with Pinar, the Bryant court declined to address the continuing vitality of Pinar 
at the time. 924 F.2d at 528. 
75. See Carroll v. United States, 721F.2d155, 156 (1983) (availability and exercise of admin-
istrative remedies precludes federal court jurisdiction), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984). 
76. See Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992). 
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Constitution and viewed as equally effective' "77 exists. Thus, statu-
tory relief is necessary to trigger preemption. 78 
3. Presence of a Comprehensive Remedial Scheme 
A third and final test for preemption utilizes the second of the two 
bases for the decision in Bush. The Supreme Court adopted this ap-
proach in Schweiker v. Chilicky. 79 Chi/icky "viewed Bush as resting on 
the premise that Congress was better positioned to decide whether a 
new damages remedy would serve the public interest."80 The Court 
found that the legislature intended to preclude a Bivens cause of action 
not because the congressional remedial scheme was constitutionally 
adequate,81 but because the extensive provisions of the statute indi-
cated Congress had balanced the conflicting interests and had deter-
mined appropriate relief accordingly. "[I]t is the comprehensiveness 
of the statutory scheme involved, not the 'adequacy' of specific reme-
dies extended thereunder, that counsels judicial abstention."82 The 
Court noted that, "When the design of a Government program sug-
gests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial 
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course 
of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens reme-
77. Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980)); see supra notes 28 and 30 and accompanying text. 
78. See, e.g., Schowengerdt, 823 F.2d at 1339; Kotarski v. Cooper (Kotarski I), 799 F.2d 
1342, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1986), revd., 866 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1989); Sonntag, 650 F.2d at 907. 
Following this reasoning, one court has ruled that the CSRA does not preclude judicial remedies 
where the constitutional deprivation entailed a denial of access to civil service remedial proce-
dures. Rauccio v. Frank, 750 F. Supp. 566, 571, 572-73 (D. Conn. 1990). 
79. 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
80. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 426-
27). The facts of Chi/icky did not occur in the context of the civil service. Rather, plaintiffs were 
Social Security recipients whose benefits were terminated in 1981and1982 pursuant to the "con-
tinuing disability review" program (CDR). The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 3ll(a), 94 Stat. 441, 460 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 421(i) 
(1988)) established the program, which required review of disability determinations at least every 
three years. See Chi/icky, 487 U.S. at 415. The CDR program was revamped in 1983, when 
Congress discovered that vast numbers of qualified Social Security beneficiaries were suffering 
after improper termination of their benefits. See Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 2, 
96 Stat. 2497, 2498-99 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(g) (1991)); see also Chilicky, 
487 U.S. at 415. The plaintiffs' benefits were eventually reinstated, but only after several months 
delay and hardship. Plaintiff Chilicky, for example, "was in the hospital recovering from open-
heart surgery when he was informed that his condition was no longer disabling." Chi/icky, 487 
U.S. at 418. The plaintiffs subsequently sued, contending that the improper procedures followed 
in terminating their benefits violated their constitutional right to due process. Although the 
Court noted that the plaintiffs had received nearly all back benefits to which they were entitled, 
487 U.S. at 417, it concluded that the elaborate appeals procedures of the Social Security Admin-
istration, not the completeness of the relief, precluded a Bivens claim. 487 U.S. at 424-27. 
81. The Court did find the statutory remedies to be "meaningful" in this particular case, 
however. Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425; see supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text; see also infra text 
accompanying note 167. 
82. Spagnola II, 859 F.2d at 227 (interpreting Chilicky ). 
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dies."83 Thus, the mere presence of a comprehensive remedial scheme 
may indicate congressional intent to preempt judicial action, even if 
the scheme provides no remedy in a particular instance. 84 Chi/icky 
effectively held that the concept of "special factors" enumerated in 
Bush 85 requires judicial deference whenever evidence demonstrates 
that congressional inaction has been deliberate. 86 
Two circuits have extended this argument to preclude constitu-
tional claims for equitable relief as well. In Saul v. United States, 81 the 
Ninth Circuit held that the "CSRA's elaborate remedies show that 
judicial interference in federal employment is disfavored, whether the 
employee requests damages or injunctive relief."88 Saul, a claims rep-
resentative for the Social Security Administration, asserted that his 
supervisors had seized and opened his personal mail, violating his con-
stitutional rights and invading his privacy. Due to the relative insig-
nificance of the injury involved, the CSRA afforded Saul only limited 
remedies. The court held irrelevant the question of the adequacy of 
relief, however; preemption occurred even where the Act provided no 
remedy whatsoever. 89 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that the 
absence of statutory relief does not necessarily imply that the court 
should grant damages or injunctive relief.90 Under this view, the com-
prehensiveness of the remedial system alone indicates congressional 
intent to preclude federal court relief. 
Decisions refusing to inquire into the effectiveness of statutory 
remedies rely on one of two assumptions. First, some courts assume 
that the Constitution does not demand a remedy for every violation of 
a right. Other courts, alternatively, perceive any remedy to be consti-
tutionally adequate, even if not available to particular categories of 
employees.91 These suppositions, however, "ignore or undervalue 
constitutional reasons for inquiring into effectiveness."92 They also 
83. Chi/icky, 487 U.S. at 423. 
84. See 487 U.S at 425-29; Kotarski v. Cooper, 866 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kotarski 
II). 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43. 
86. 487 U.S. at 423; Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Saul, 928 
F.2d at 837 (noting that no Bivens action was permitted in Kotarski II because Congress' failure 
to provide a remedy in that case was not inadvertent); Barhorst v. Marsh, 765 F. Supp. 995, 998 
(E.D. Mo. 1991) ("Congress' explicit reference to constitutional rights in the CSRA and its pro-
vision of a limited remedy in the form of an OSC investigation demonstrate that the omission of a 
damages remedy for plaintiff's alleged constitutional wrong was not 'inadvertent.' "). 
87. 928 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1991). 
88. 928 F.2d at 843. 
89. See 928 F.2d at 839-40, 843 ("The CSRA precludes Saul from seeking injunctive relief 
for his asserted constitutional injury just as it precludes him from bringing a Bivens action for 
damages."). 
90. Lombardi v. Small Business Admin., 889 F.2d 959 (10th Cir. 1989). 
91. Note, supra note 4, at 1257. 
92. Id.; see infra sections III.A and 111.B. 
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disregard a long-standing practice within the judiciary of enjoining un-
constitutional conduct by government officials.93 Courts which re-
quire an explicit statement from Congress or the provision of a 
meaningful remedy before finding congressional intent to preempt at 
least ensure that federal employees are not deprived of constitutional 
protection except by congressional design. Simply put, legislative in-
action should not constitute sufficient evidence of congressional intent 
to deny federal employees effective relief. 
This conclusion applies forcefully to the Civil Service Reform Act. 
As the next Part notes, Congress intended that this legislation provide 
greater protections for civil servants, not deprive them of all remedies. 
Failure of the Reform Act's remedial scheme has frustrated this in-
tent. The judiciary should not further deprive federal employees of 
effective constitutional protection absent a more explicit congressional 
indication. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT 
The Civil Service Reform Act of 197894 significantly restructured 
the federal civil service, affecting nearly three million employees.95 
This Part considers the merits of the CSRA. Section II.A examines 
the intended goals of the Act and the organizational framework em-
ployed to effect these goals. Section II.B describes the remedial proce-
dures established to protect employee rights. Finally, section II.C 
discusses the many problems which prevent this remedial scheme from 
fully guaranteeing the constitutional rights of civil servants. This Part 
concludes that injunctive relief remains necessary to protect many fed-
eral employees. 
A. Purposes and Organization 
With the Civil Service Reform Act, Congress aimed to improve the 
operating efficiency of federal agencies. Congress passed the CSRA 
partly in response to a growing consensus among Americans that the 
civil service was fundamentally inefficient, plagued by ineffective em-
ployees, and hindered by mismanagement and flagrant waste.96 By its 
93. See infra text accompanying note 183. 
94. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 
28, 31, 38, 39, and 42 U.S.C. (1988)). 
95. This is according to official statistics at the time. U.S. Employee Roll Excludes Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1978, at 18. The civil service has since grown to over 3 million employees. 
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISflCS: EM-
PLOYMENT AND TRENDS AS OF JAN. 1992 (1992). 
96. See Hearings on H.R. 11,280 Before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1978) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 11,280] (statement of James M. 
Mitchell, Panel Chairman, National Academy of Public Administration); Andrew Baran, Fed-
eral Employment- The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 -Removing Incompetents and Protect-
ing "Whistle Blowers," 26 WAYNE L. REv. 97 (1979); Patricia W. Ingraham, The Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978: Its Design and Legislative History, in LEGISLATING BUREAUCRATIC 
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terms, the Act sought to "provide the people of the United States with 
a competent, honest, and productive Federal work force reflective of 
the Nation's diversity, and to improve the quality of public service."97 
Congress endeavored to effect this purpose in two ways: first, by 
facilitating the firing of incompetent employees, and second, by pro-
viding greater protection for employees who speak out against wrong-
doing or waste within their agencies. 98 Achieving these goals 
simultaneously required a "delicate balance between the legitimate 
rights of employees and the inherent responsibilities of managers -
underpinned in every instance by a commitment to the principles of 
merit in public employment."99 At no time did supporters of the legis-
lation assert that governmental efficiency required a weakening of fed-
eral employees' rights. Proponents believed that strengthening 
protections for qualified, competent employees would improve the effi-
ciency of the civil service. I00 
The Civil Service Reform Act created two independent agencies to 
administer the civil service. IOI Under this regime, the Office of Per-
sonnel Management (OPM) manages the civil service, 102 while the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) maintains the merit sys-
CHANGE: THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM Ac::r OF 1978, at 14 (Patricia w. Ingraham & Carolyn 
Ban eds., 1984). 
97. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 3, 92 Stat. 1111, 1112 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1101 
(1988)). 
98. Benjamin C. lndig, Comment, The Rights of Probationary Federal Employee 
Whistleblowers Since the Enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 11 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 567, 567 (1983). Employees who disclose instances of fraud or inefficiency within govern· 
ment, protected under 5 U.S.C.A. § 1213 (West. Supp. 1992), are often referred to ns 
"whistleblowers." See Baran, supra note 96, at 98; Ingraham, supra note 96, at 18. In first 
proposing the legislation, the Carter administration intended to protect whistleblowers and expe· 
dite the firing of incompetents. See Civil Service Reform: Message From the President of the 
United States Transmitting a Draft of Proposed Legislation to Reform the Civil Service Laws, 
H.R. Doc. No. 95-269, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1978); Baran, supra note 96, at 97-98; Ingra· 
ham, supra note 96, at 16-17; cf. Hearings on H.R. 11,280, supra note 96, at 3 (statement of Hon. 
James T. Mcintyre, Director, Office of Management and Budget). Campaigning for the presi-
dency in 1976, Carter stressed the case of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a former Air Force efficiency 
expert who was fired by the Pentagon when he publicly disclosed some $2 billion in cost over· 
runs. "I intend to seek strong legislation to protect our Federal employees ... if they find out 
and report waste or dishonesty," Carter pledged. Richard D. Lyons, Carter Plans Proposal to 
Protect "Whistle-Blowers" in Government, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1978, at Al8. 
99. Hearings on H.R. 11,280. supra note 96, at 7 (statement of Hon. James T. Mcintyre, 
Director, Office of Management and Budget). 
100. Id. at 29 (statement of Alan K. Campbell, Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission on 
Civil Service Reform and Reorganization) ("The protection of whistleblowers is, in our judg-
ment, essential to the improvement of the public service.''); Id. at 200 (statement of James M. 
Mitchell, Panel Chairman, National Academy of Public Administration) ("Protection is needed 
to insure the rights of individual employees and the integrity of the system.''), 
101. Many commentators perceived the assignment of all functions to one agency, the Civil 
Service Commission, as a significant problem of the old civil service system. S. REP. No. 969, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2727; Baran, supra note 96, at 106 
n.81; lndig, supra note 98, at 569; see also Martin Tolchin, Carter Seeks Change in Civil Service 
Law lo Reward Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1978 at Al, AlO. 
102. 5 u.s.c. §§ 1101-05 (1988). 
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tem. 103 The MSPB serves a quasi-judicial function, adjudicating dis-
putes between federal workers and their agencies. The Board defines 
its duties as "protecting the integrity of Federal merit systems against 
prohibited personnel practices, ensuring adequate protection for em-
ployees against abuses by agency management, and requiring Federal 
executive branch agencies to make employment decisions based on in-
dividual merit."104 Within the MSPB, the Office of Special Counsel 
{OSC) acts as prosecutor, investigating allegations of "prohibited per-
sonnel practices" and recommending action where it deems 
necessary. 105 
B. Remedial Procedures 
An agency may take action against an employee "only for such 
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service."106 Measures range 
from a letter of warning to demotion or outright dismissal. 107 An em-
ployee facing such adverse action has two primary methods of appeal 
to the Board: a "chapter 77" appeal, 108 or a petition to the Special 
Counsel, requesting that the OSC take corrective action. 109 
Chapter 77 appeals are the most common method by which 
agency-employee disputes reach the MSPB. Typically, the federal 
worker, having exhausted intra-agency administrative procedures, re-
quests review of the resulting disciplinary action by the Board. Only 
certain employees, however, have this right to a hearing.110 Many 
103. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-05 (West Supp. 1992). The Board is comprised of three members 
appointed by the President with Senate approval. There are no requirements for the office, other 
than that appointees "demonstrate[] ability, background, training, or experience" making them 
"especially qualified to carry out the functions of the Board." 5 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 
1992). Members serve for one seven-year term. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1202(a) (West Supp. 1992). 
104. U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, STUDY OF CASES DECIDED BY THE 
UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 1 (1991) [herein-
after MSPB STUDY]. 
105. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (West Supp. 1992). The Special Counsel is an attorney appointed by 
the president with the advice and consent of the Senate. A Special Counsel serves for one term of 
five years. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1211 (West Supp. 1992). 
106. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1988). Generally, 30 days written notice of the proposed action is 
required. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 4303(b)(l)(A), 7513(b)(l) (1988). 
107. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7512 (West Supp. 1992) (listing more extreme disciplinary actions 
covered by CSRA). 
108. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (1988). 
109. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212 (West Supp. 1992). Federal employees subject to a collective bar-
gaining agreement can also appeal through grievance resolution procedures required under 5 
U.S.C. § 7121(a)(l) (1988). See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834-35 (9th Cir. 1991). 
Furthermore, any employee can file an unfair labor practice charge with the Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority, which has the power to enjoin the adverse action if it determines that such 
action constitutes an unfair labor practice. 5 U.S.C. § 7118 (1988). Discussion of these remedial 
procedures is outside the scope of this note. For further description, see Keefe v. Library of 
Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1984), ajfd. in part and revd. in part, 777 F.2d 1573 (1985). 
110. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (1988) grants this right only to those federal workers who are "pref-
erence eligibles," as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1988) (mostly veterans), or members of the 
competitive service under 5 U.S.C. § 2102 (1988). 
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workers, such as probationers, 111 excepted employees, 112 job appli-
cants, 113 and employees alleging "prohibited personnel practices" that 
are too minor to fall within the statutory provisions, 114 have no such 
entitlement. For these employees, the Office of the Special Counsel 
provides the only means of redress. While courts have noted that 
withholding this right to direct appeal stems from a congressional de-
sire to remove incompetent workers, 115 this denial also may lessen pro-
tections for qualified employees.116 
The second method by which an employee can appeal to the Merit 
Systems Protection Board is to petition the OSC to take "corrective 
action."117 For probationers, applicants, and other excepted civil ser-
vants, 118 such a petition is their only mode of appeal.119 Upon receiv-
111. Piskadlo v. Veterans' Admin., 668 F.2d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 1982). 5 U.S.C. § 332l(a) 
(1988) allows the executive branch to hire employees on a probationary basis. This provision 
permits federal agencies to ensure employees are competent before appointment to the competi· 
tive service or a managerial position becomes final. 
Under the CSRA, probationers are entitled to review by the MSPB in just three cases. First, 
a probationary worker can appeal directly to the Board alleging discrimination covered by one of 
the statutes specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(l)(B) (1988), such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1988), prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin; the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988), prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sex; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988), 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicapped condition; and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1988); or the probationer can appeal alleging 
discrimination based on partisan political reasons or marital status. 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b) 
(1992); see Piskadlo, 668 F.2d at 84. 
Second, a probationer can appeal where termination was for conditions arising before ap-
pointment and the employee alleges that procedural requirements were not met. 5 C.F.R. 
§§ 315.805-.806 (1992). Finally, all employees, including probationers, who allege reprisal for 
"whistleblowing" may appeal directly to the Board after other remedies are exhausted. See infra 
note 119. 
112. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 751 l(a)(l)(c) (West Supp. 1992). Excepted service employees are all 
civil service workers who are not in the competitive service. 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (1988). This cate-
gory initially included attorneys, teachers, scientists, and chaplains. Addressing problems with 
OSC procedures, see infra text accompanying note 150, Congress extended many of these em-
ployees the right to a hearing before the MSPB under the Civil Service Due Process Amend-
ments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, § 2, 104 Stat. 461, 462 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511 (West 
Supp. 1992)). See MSPB STUDY, supra note 104, at 8. 
113. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511(a)(l) (West Supp. 1992) (excluding applicants from definition of 
"employee"). 
114. For the employee to have a right to a Board hearing, the action must be a removal, a 
suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less. 
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7512 (West Supp. 1992). Thus, an employee alleging improper failure to pro-
mote or termination of a temporary promotion has no right to MSPB review. See Spagnola II, 
859 F.2d at 225 (failure to promote); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 905 (4th Cir. 1984) (termina-
tion of temporary promotion), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1018 (1985). Any federal employee, regard· 
less of statutory classification, who alleges the adverse action was taken because that employee 
"blew the whistle" on improper activity may be entitled to Board review. See infra note 119. 
115. Piskadlo, 668 F.2d at 83 n.1. 
116. See notes infra section 11.C. 
117. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214 (West Supp. 1992). 
118. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
119. If such an employee specifically alleges the adverse action was a reprisal for 
whistleblowing, the employee has the option to request a hearing before the MSPB under the 
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ing a petition, the Special Counsel must investigate the allegation "to 
the extent necessary to determine whether there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, 
exists, or is to be taken."120 A prohibited personnel practice is an ac-
tion affecting an employee's position or pay, among other measures, 
premised on discriminatory intent or similar improper motive. 121 If 
the OSC concludes that reasonable grounds are present, the Special 
Counsel reports the situation to the Board and may recommend cor-
rective action. If the agency fails to follow the recommended action, 
the MSPB may order the agency to do so.122 
An employee may appeal a final decision by the Board to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 123 At no other time do the 
courts play a role in the CSRA's remedial scheme. Unless an em-
ployee's case gets to the Merit Systems Protection Board - through a 
chapter 77 appeal or by a finding of "reasonable grounds" by the OSC 
- the CSRA provides the employee no hearing on the allegations in 
federal court. 
C. Failure of the Remedial Scheme To Provide Sufficient 
Protections 
Congress aimed to improve the efficiency of the civil service by 
providing increased protections for competent federal employees, in-
cluding whistleblowers. 124 This strategy reveals that the legislature 
recognized that employee disclosures of fraud and mismanagement 
within federal agencies were powerful weapons for curbing inefficiency 
in government, but that the current safeguards afforded employees 
were not sufficient to encourage these disclosures. 125 Thus, "Congress 
intended the CSRA to provide additional, not decreased, protection 
for federal employees who blow the whistle on illegal or improper gov-
ernment conduct."126 Because Congress passed the CSRA seven years 
after the Bivens decision, it may have assumed that judicial remedies 
would remain available to federal employees and designed the statu-
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1992)). This hearing is available, however, only after OSC 
procedures are exhausted and the Office closes the case. See Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989, supra, at sec. 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. at 24-25 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214 (a)(3) (West Supp. 
1992)). 
120. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1992). The OSC can also make such an inves-
tigation in the absence of a petition alleging the prohibited conduct. 
121. 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302 (West Supp. 1992). 
122. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214(b)(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1992). 
123. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(a) (West Supp. 1992). 
124. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. 
125. See Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of Authority: The Office of the Spe-
cial Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 12-14 (1986). 
126. Borrell v. United States Intl. Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 990 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); see also Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 16-17. 
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tory relief with that assumption in mind.127 
The gap between legislative intent and reality under the Reform 
Act has widened since the statute's implementation. Many classes of 
federal employees subjected to prohibited personnel practices have 
been refused judicial remedies128 as well as statutory relief. 129 Fur-
thermore, although whistleblowers are guaranteed an eventual hearing 
before the Merit Systems Protection Board under the Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, 130 the detailed procedural requirements dra-
matically increase the length of time a bona fide whistleblower must 
wait before relief is rendered. Most commentators attach primary re-
sponsibility for this failure to protect employee rights swiftly and effi-
ciently to the Office of the Special Counsel.131 Statistics gathered since 
the passage of the CSRA support this conclusion. In the early 1980s, 
a survey by the Merit Systems Protection Board reported that nearly 
half of all federal employees claimed they had recently observed waste 
or fraud within their agencies, 132 yet seventy percent of these individu-
als kept this knowledge to themselves.133 This unwillingness of sub-
stantial numbers of employees to expose improper and illegal behavior 
may result from the Special Counsel's poor record of protecting fed-
eral employees.134 For example, in 1990 the Special Counsel afforded 
an actual investigation to only seventeen percent of employees who pe-
127. See Note, supra note 4, at 1266; see also Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 63 (quoting 
an ainicus curiae brief submitted in the Bush case by several primary sponsors of the CSRA: 
"The express reliance by the Court below, in denying a Bivens remedy, on the availability of 
alternative civil service remedies was in error . . . . [C]ongressional intent is clearly to the con· 
trary, and supports the implication of a Bivens remedy."). Passage of the Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16, and the Civil Service Due Process 
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (1990), demonstrates Congress' unhappiness 
with the remedies available under the CSRA. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
128. "[A]n unintended side effect of the legislation is the judicial interpretation that the Act 
largely precludes the constitutional remedies that were available to federal employees before its 
passage." Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 57. Testimony before Congress evinces a similar 
theme. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Oversight, 1980 - Whistleblower: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on the Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings]. 
129. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra note 119. 
131. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 24-25; Indig, supra note 98, at 577-79; Note, 
supra note 4, at 1262-65. 
132. Role of Whistleblowers in Administrative Proceedings: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearing] (statement of Senator Howell Heflin). 
133. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1986: Hearings on R.R. 4033 Before the Subcomm. 011 
Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1986) 
[hereinafter Hearings on R.R. 4033] (statement of Thomas Devine, Legal Director, Government 
Accountability Project). 
134. " 'There has been a significant increase in the fear of reprisal as the reason given for not 
having reported fraud, waste, and abuse.'" Id. at 116 (statement of Thomas Devine, Legal Di· 
rector, Government Accountability Project) (quoting a MSPB press release from Jan. 16, 1985 
that reported 37% fear reprisal for whistleblowing compared with 20% in 1980); see also Devine 
& Aplin, supra note 125, at 25. 
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titioned for assistance.135 Although these figures are not conclusive, 
they suggest that the Office of the Special Counsel has failed in its 
mission to investigate vigorously allegations of prohibited personnel 
practices and protect federal employee rights. 136 
Two weaknesses of the OSC under the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978 explain this failure. First, the Act requires the OSC to request 
corrective action from the Board if there are "reasonable grounds" to 
believe a prohibited personnel practice has occurred.137 The Special 
Counsel, however, often does not bring the appeal "unless it believes 
the Act's goal of achieving a 'fair, efficient, and lawfully conducted 
Civil Service' requires it."138 The Special Counsel's decision whether 
to proceed with a petition for corrective action thus often rests not on 
the interests of the employee, as required by the CSRA, but on the 
OSC's perception of the interest of the entire civil service system.139 
This approach contradicts the self-expressed purpose of the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board to promote the integrity of Federal merit sys-
tems and protect federal employees from abuses. 140 Efficiency 
becomes the test for the OSC, not protection of employee rights. 
Although overall efficiency of the system may improve with thorough 
vindication of employee rights, the Special Counsel may not perceive 
this benefit in every case. 
Second, the CSRA provides the Office of the Special Counsel with 
no standards of accountability for the conduct of investigations.141 
Although the Act requires that the Office "receive and investigate alle-
gations of prohibited personnel practices,"142 the statute provides no 
135. Out of 1623 complaints filed with the OSC in 1990, only 284 received investigation, 
either as whistleblower complaints under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 or via regu-
lar Office procedures. U.S. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL CoUNSEL, A REPORT TO CoNGRESS FROM 
THE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL CoUNSEL, FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 5 (1991) [hereinafter osc RE-
PORT]. In recent years, only eight percent of petitioners received an investigation. Devine & 
Aplin, supra note 125, at 29-30; see also Whistleblower Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 508 
Before the Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 508] (testimony 
of Senator Carl Levin) (92% do not receive an in-depth investigation). 
136. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 30-33. 
137. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1992). 
138. lndig, supra note 98, at 576 (quoting Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 
162 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). 
139. ·Frazier. 612 F.2d at 162 (noting that the OSC is not a "public defender" for federal 
employees); see also Hearings on S.508, supra note 135, at 4 (testimony of Senator Carl Levin) 
(noting that K. William O'Connor, when Special Counsel, continually emphasized that he had 
no duty to protect individual employees, but rather his sole obligation was to the "merit sys-
tem"); Note, supra note 4, at 1264 ("The Office is concerned not only with remedying violations 
of the Constitution, but with handling all of the problems, statutory and regulatory, that attend a 
civil service system .... When such considerations influence the Office to decide not to pursue a 
case, •.. resort to the OSC has not guaranteed any relief."). 
140. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
141. Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 21. 
142. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1212(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992). 
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guidelines as to what level of action satisfies the duty to investigate. 
The Merit Systems Protection Board consistently has declined to su-
pervise the execution of OSC's authority.143 Similarly, the Reform 
Act does not obligate the Office to prosecute or seek a stay in any 
particular case, regardless of the facts. 144 All actions or omissions by 
the OSC are thus unreviewable, 145 effectively subjecting the Special 
Counsel to an "honor system."146 
The extensive discretion afforded the Special Counsel may lead to 
ineffective protection of the rights of civil servants. As commentators 
have noted: 
Remedies whose enforcement are at the mercy of a bureaucratic cham-
pion's whims inherently provide "soft" rights that are vulnerable to ad-
ministrative abuse of authority. In the case of the Reform Act, the Office 
of the Special Counsel, responsible for protecting the civil service rights 
of federal employees, has disintegrated into an effective weapon against 
the intended beneficiaries.147 
This conclusion accurately describes the state of affairs under the ad-
ministrations of recent Special Counsels, who have shown a lack of 
concern - and even outright disrespect - for employees who disclose 
waste and fraud within government.148 Furthermore, the Civil Service 
143. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 21 & n.93 (collecting cases). 
144. Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
145. Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1982); lndig, supra 
note 98, at 576-78. In Wren, the D.C. Circuit found that the Special Counsel had closed the 
petitioner's case without making even the limited investigation mandated by the CSRA, but that 
the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to review the closure. 681 F.2d at 874-75. 
146. Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 21. 
147. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted); see also Patricia Schroeder, Introduction, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 
(1986): 
[N]ot one of the four individuals who has served as Special Counsel has been successful. 
The first two, who served under the Carter Administration, lost virtually all the cases they 
brought. The two appointed by President Reagan somehow were unaware of the employee 
protection nature of the job. One, Alex Kozinski, used his position as Special Counsel as a 
springboard to become a Federal Court of Appeals judge. The other, K. William O'Connor, 
thought that he was a prosecutor, out to punish the bad guys. He considered victims of 
prohibited personnel practices to be mere witnesses. 
Id. at 2-3. 
148. Note an exchange in 1985 between Representative Schroeder and Special Counsel K. 
William O'Connor: 
Q: In your statement you say that most managers follow the law. 
A: That is my firm belief. 
Q: And have integrity. 
A: That is my firm belief. 
Q. And that most whistleblowers are malcontents. 
A: That has been my experience. 
Whistleblower Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil Service of the House Comm. on 
Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 259 (1985). O'Connor also testified that he 
would not seek corrective action from the MSPB unless there was "a virtual certainty" of suc-
cess, Hearings on S. 508, supra note 135, at 4 (testimony of Senator Carl Levin), despite the fact 
that the CSRA requires the OSC to petition the Board when there are "reasonable grounds" to 
believe a prohibited personnel practice has occurred. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1214(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 
1992); see also 1980 Hearings, supra note 128, at 116 (statement of David T. Evans, Department 
of Commerce) (criticizing OSC for acting only after pressure from the media and Congress): 
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administration has consistently opposed legislation intended to pro-
vide greater protections for federal employees.149 Because the protec-
tions of the OSC are wholly discretionary, and subject to serious abuse 
under certain individuals, the right to petition the Special Counsel 
cannot adequately remedy violations of federal employees' constitu-
tional rights. 150 
In response to these problems under the original Civil Service Re-
form Act, Congress enacted additional legislation to improve the safe-
guards furnished to civil servants.151 Although these improvements in 
the available remedial scheme suggest that judicial remedies are no 
longer so vitally important to guarantee employee rights, they also 
suggest that Congress never intended that certain employees be de-
prived of constitutionally adequate remedies. Furthermore, many civil 
service employees remain unprotected despite this legislation. Proba-
tioners, some excepted employees, job applicants, and employees who 
allege constitutional deprivations that do not fall under the statutory 
definition of "prohibited personnel practice," still possess no right to a 
hearing before the MSPB.152 They continue to find their constitu-
tional rights subject to the discretion of the OSC bureaucracy, whose 
central concern is often only the "efficiency" of the civil service. Only 
individuals within these groups who specifically allege reprisal for 
whistleblowing activities are guaranteed a hearing before the Board, 
and then only after exhausting available OSC procedures.153 
The end result of this statutory scheme is that employees' constitu-
tional rights are afforded dramatically different treatment depending 
Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 30-33, 39-41, 53-56 (outlining ways in which OSC has frus-
trated purposes of the CSRA). 
149. See Hearings on H.R. 4033, supra note 133, at 3 (statement of K. William O'Conner, 
Special Counsel) (opposing amendment which would furnish improved whistleblower protec-
tions); Administrative Due Process for Certain Federal Employees: Hearing on H.R. 917 Before 
the Subcomm. on the Civil Service of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1985) (statement of Llewellyn M. Fischer, Associate General Counsel of 
OPM) (objecting to bill that would extend right of direct appeal to the MSPB to certain ex-
cepted-service employees). 
150. See Note, supra note 4, at 1263; see also infra sections III.A and III.B. 
151. See Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (1990) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511 (West Supp. 1992)) (extending right of direct appeal to certain 
excepted-service employees); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 
Stat. 16 (codified at scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1992)) (strengthening protec-
tions for federal employees by establishing OSC as a separate agency independent of MSPB and 
allowing petitioners to seek a hearing with the Board directly if the Special Counsel does not take 
action). 
152. The Civil Service Due Process Amendments only extended the right to a Board hearing 
to 100,000 additional employees. MSPB STUDY, supra note 104, at 1; see also supra notes 110-16 
and accompanying text. 
153. These federal employees must allege their disclosure of a violation of law, rule, or regu-
lation; gross mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority; or a substantial and spe-
cific danger to the public health or safety triggered the adverse action. See Whistleblower 
Protection Act of 1989, sec. 3(a)(ll), § 1213(a)(l), 103 Stat. 21. In 1990, the OSC judged that 
103 of the 1623 complaints filed met this standard. OSC REPORT, supra note 135, at 5. 
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on the severity and reason for the disciplinary action, the length of 
employment with the civil service, and the type of job performed. A 
competitive service employee who claims she was fired for exposing 
fraud within a federal agency is entitled to a direct hearing before the 
Merit Systems Protection Board, and can appeal an adverse decision 
by the Board to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. A 
probationary employee in the same position must first petition the Spe-
cial Counsel for relief; only after the OSC has closed the case is the 
probationer entitled to a hearing before the MSPB. A competitive ser-
vice employee suspended for fifteen days for participation in a political 
demonstration possesses the right to a direct hearing before the Board 
and judicial review by the Federal Circuit Court. If that same em-
ployee is suspended for only fourteen days, no such entitlements exist. 
The decision whether or not to review the case lies solely with the 
Special Counsel. Although these bright-line rules specifying when an 
employee has a right to independent review of disciplinary action are 
administratively useful, this benefit should not overwhelm the impor-
tance of providing adequate protection for federal employees' constitu-
tional rights. The need for injunctive relief remains in many instances. 
Ill. A CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT FOR EQUITABLE REMEDIES 
Federal employees who allege constitutional deprivations in fed-
eral court typically point to adverse personnel actions by a superior as 
the essence of the constitutional violation. Such employees seek relief 
from the courts because they claim remedies within the mechanism of 
the civil service are insufficient or lackfug altogether. Specifically, they 
seek relief from unconstitutional conduct by superiors in imposing dis-
ciplinary action.154 The issue is to what extent Congress can preempt 
154. The claim that a supervisor infringed a federal employee's constitutional rights and that 
available procedures did not provide sufficient relief can also take the form of a suit for denial of 
due process. For example, an employee who alleges she was denied a promotion for attending a 
political rally could bring a claim contending she was deprived of her First Amendment rights, 
or she could allege that the adverse action violated her liberty interest in freedom of speech and 
assembly without due process oflaw. Such claims differ from the case where an employee does 
not assert that the personnel action was unconstitutional, but rather claims that the remedial 
process itself is constitutionally deficient. This second class of plaintiffs contends that the very 
process of ascertaining whether a prohibited personnel practice has occurred and providing relief 
is so ineffective as to constitute a denial of due process. These employees do not premise their 
constitutional claim on the initial adverse action, but on the subsequent administrative and civil 
service review. They assert they have a property interest in their employment, and are entitled 
under the Constitution to more effective review procedures before that property right can be 
taken from them. 
Under this second type of due process claim, Congress may preclude judicial action more 
easily. The Supreme Court has adopted a two-step approach for determining the due process 
protections to which public employees are entitled when dismissed. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). First, the court looks to the 
nature of the interest at stake to ascertain if constitutional protection is warranted. See Roth, 408 
U.S. at 570-71. If the employee's position is uncertain, such as that of a probationer, the em-
ployee's interest in the job may not entail a property interest subject to due process protections. 
Alternatively, the disciplinary action may be so minor that no deprivation of a property interest 
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judicial relief for violations with an alternate scheme that could yield 
unremedied constitutional deprivations. 
This Part emphasizes the importance of equitable relief to ensure 
adequate protection of civil servants' constitutional rights. Section 
III.A explores the possible existence of constitutional minima which 
necessitate that deprivations of constitutional rights be remedied. This 
section argues that the judiciary must ensure that any alternative legis-
lative scheme meets these standards. Absent such statutory assur-
ances, courts should enjoin unconstitutional conduct where necessary 
to meet constitutional minima. Section III.B argues that even if such 
constitutional requirements do not exist and Congress does have the 
power to strip federal employees' constitutional rights of all meaning-
ful remedies, courts must ensure that Congress intentionally elimi-
nated equitable remedies before finding a statutory scheme to preempt 
judicial action. Due to continued disagreement over the Civil Service 
Reform Act's preclusive effect, courts should find the Act to preempt 
injunctive relief only where statutory remedies provide effective pro-
tection. Section III.C concludes by noting the importance of equitable 
relief in adequately protecting constitutional rights in many cases, and 
how such protection can benefit the efficiency of the civil service. 
A. Constitutional Requirements 
The extent to which Congress can preempt judicial remedies for 
constitutional violations hinges substantially on whether the Constitu-
occurs, even if the employee does have such an interest in the job. But "[w]hile the legislature 
may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally 
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural 
safeguards." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the result). Thus, the second inquiry entails an evaluation of the procedures neces-
sary to guarantee constitutional due process, Baran, supra note 96, at 102, where the civil servant 
has "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to the government sector job. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. In 
Arnett, six justices agreed that the Constitution provided some protections for federal employees 
who could be dismissed only for just cause, holding that a full evidentiary hearing was required. 
416 U.S. at 163, 170, 178. Of these six, only Justice White required the hearing to occur prior to 
discipline. 416 U.S. at 185. The evidentiary hearing may thus take place at any time prior to or 
subsequent to the adverse personnel action. 
These decisions recognize congressional power to preempt federal court involvement in due 
process claims, through the mere provision of an evidentiary hearing, whenever the individual 
has a legitimate claim of entitlement. Review procedures within the agencies and the right to 
appeal to the MSPB under the Reform Act meet this minimum burden for most civil servants 
with a justifiably legitimate claim to their jobs. 
These procedural due process cases clearly demonstrate, however, that this analysis does not 
apply where the disciplinary action itself is unconstitutional. The requirement that the civil ser-
vant have a legitimate claim to the job is irrelevant to the determination whether the adverse 
action itself constitutes a constitutional deprivation. 
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though 
the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons 
upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis 
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests •... 
Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. The question this Part addresses is whether such a deprivation must be 
remedied. 
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tion mandates a remedy for constitutional deprivations. Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics held that 
when government actors violate constitutional rights, "federal courts 
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done."155 The 
Court recognized a cause of action for money damages as necessary to 
correct the harm. Some commentators have read this conclusion to be 
constitutional interpretation; that is, in Bivens the Constitution itself 
required a damage remedy.156 The opinions of Justices Brennan and 
Harlan support this theory, by indicating that the Court must provide 
a damages remedy, "lest it be in dereliction of its fourth amendment 
duties."157 Other commentators disagree, labeling the result in Bivens 
as constitutional common law.158 In the opinion of these common law 
theorists, Bivens went "beyond the minimum requirements of the Con-
stitution to carry out the purposes and policies of the fourth amend-
ment."159 Thus, Congress can alter the judicially created remedy. 160 
This latter view appears to have carried the day. The majority the-
ory that Bivens constituted common law, 161 and thus that the legisla-
ture can replace the judicial remedy with another form of relief, 
prevailed in Bush v. Lucas. 162 In that case, the Supreme Court did not 
require that Congress view the alternative remedial scheme to be 
equally effective as the judicial remedy.163 The existence of constitu-
tionally adequate relief164 defeated the cause of action for damages, 
despite the Court's assumption that the alternative civil service rem-
edy did not fully compensate the federal employee.165 Yet the Court 
did not explain why the statutory remedy was constitutionally ade-
quate, or whether the Constitution implied damage remedies for depri-
155. 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
156. See, e.g., Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117, 1135-36 (1978) (arguing Bivens is a constitutional, as opposed 
to common law, decision because "it prevents the fourth amendment from being rendered 11 
'mere form of words' in the relevant sense of that phrase. . • • [T]he constitutional guarnntee 
embraces a right of action."). 
157. Id. at 1136. 
158. See, e.g., John H.W. Hinchcliff, Note, The Limits of Implied Constitutional Damages 
Actions: New Boundaries for Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1244 n.50, 1245 n.51 (1980); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1172 
(1986); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term -Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1975). 
159. Joan Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications a/This Retreat for the Vindi-
cation of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 279 (1984). 
160. Id. at 281; Note, supra note 4, at 1258. 
161. See Note, supra note 4, at 1258. 
162. 462 U.S. 367 (1983); see Meltzer, supra note 158, at 1172; accord Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228, 248 (either a traditional damage remedy or some other constitutionally adequate relief 
necessary). 
163. Steinman, supra note 159, at 294. 
164. Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14. 
165. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
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vations of rights.166 The Supreme Court, however, has denied judicial 
relief for constitutional violations only where Congress has created an 
alternative remedy which provides meaningful relief. In both 
Schweiker and Bush, the Court found available remedies to be ade-
quate.167 Furthermore, the Court has long recognized the power of 
the judiciary to enjoin conduct by federal officials which violates the 
Constitution.168 A strong argument can thus be made that while Con-
gress may provide exclusive remedies where those remedies are ade-
quate, it may not preclude all relief for constitutional violations. In 
essence, some relief may be constitutionally required. 
Traditionally, protection of individual rights under the Constitu-
tion has been primarily the function of the judicial branch, not the 
legislature.169 This power arises under Article III, which reads, "The 
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases arising under this Constitu-
tion." 170 The courts, however, have recognized that alternative con-
gressional schemes may preempt common law judicial remedies. 171 In 
the field of criminal law, for example, the opinion in Miranda v. Ari-
zona 112 repeatedly stressed the Court's willingness to accept alterna-
tive procedures which would achieve the underlying policies of the 
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.173 Remedial 
schemes offered by certain branches of government, therefore, can pre-
clude a federal cause of action if that scheme meets minimum constitu-
tional standards, as both the legislature and judiciary may give 
constitutional rights substantive protection.174 It remains the respon-
sibility of the judiciary, however, to ensure that legislated remedies for 
constitutional deprivations meet these minima.11s 
166. See Steinman, supra note 159, at 295-96. 
167. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988); Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 n.14; accord 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 243-44 (1979) (recognizing the cause of action where plaintiff 
"has no effective means other than the judiciary to vindicate [constitutional] rights"). 
168. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 690 (1949). 
Sovereign immunity does not bar injunctive relief where the government official acts in excess of 
her legal authority, i.e., unconstitutionally. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); 
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 24, at 474. 
169. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., 
concurring); Monaghan, supra note 158, at 18; see also Steinman, supra note 159, at 299 ("The 
courts unquestionably act within their legitimate institutional role in awarding damages to re-
dress violations of constitutional rights ...• [T]he courts are, and are intended by the Constitu-
tion to be, the branch of government primarily responsible for enforcing the duties imposed by 
the Bill of Rights upon the government."). 
170. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2; see Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Consti-
tution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1541 (1972). 
171. See supra section I.B. 
172. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
173. See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 467. 
174. Dellinger, supra note 170, at 1552. 
175. Steinman, supra note 159, at 339; see also Dellinger, supra note 170, at 1549 (Court 
should defer to the legislature's alternative scheme only where "(1) Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy considered by Congress to be equally effective in enforcing the Constitution, 
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The question is to what extent must every constitutional depriva-
tion be remedied to sufficiently protect the right. Two approaches to 
this issue exist. The first theory postulates that every violation re-
quires a remedy. Justice Marshall drew upon this notion in Marbury 
v. Madison, 116 when he noted: "The very essence of civil liberty cer-
tainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of 
government is to afford that protection."177 This language closely 
tracks a basic maxim of law - ubi jus, ibi remedium: Where there is a 
right, there should be a remedy. 178 James Madison reaffirmed this 
proposition in The Federalist, 179 and this thesis formed the bedrock for 
Marshall's opinion in Marbury. "The government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation if the laws fur-
nish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right," Justice Mar-
shall asserted. 180 
Realist legal thought adopted this approach, arguing that the exist-
ence of a right turned on the enforcement of that right through the 
provision of necessary relief. "[A] right is best measured by effects in 
life. Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect 
of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts will do." 181 
Under this theory, every constitutional deprivation requires relief. 
Without a remedy, individual rights under the Constitution effectively 
become meaningless. 182 The longstanding tradition of enjoining un-
constitutional conduct exemplifies this view. For many years, federal 
courts have recognized judicial power to render injunctive relief 
against federal officials as a necessary component of the judiciary's 
function. 183 Such relief is essential to protect constitutional rights. 
and (2) the Court concludes that in light of the substituted remedy, the displaced remedy is no 
longer 'necessary' to effectuate the constitutional guarantee"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legisla· 
tive Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915, 939-42 (1988) 
(appellate review of the decisions of administrative tribunals by a constitutional court is mini· 
malty necessary to protect Article III values). But see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress 
to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 
1372-73 (1953) ("It's hard ..• to read into Article III any guarantee to a civil litigant ofa hearing 
in a federal constitutional court .•. if Congress chooses to provide some alternative procedure."). 
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
177. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (emphasis added). 
178. Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1485-86 (1987). 
179. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 274-75 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
180. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163. 
181. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 83-84 (1960); cf. GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, 
JURISPRUDENCE 790 (1973) (noting that the legal realists criticized the notion of "rights without 
remedies" as "nonsense"). 
182. Note, supra note 4, at 1259; see also Steinman, supra note 159, at 298 (discussing First 
Amendment remedies); lndig, supra note 98, at 586 (same). 
183. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949) 
(noting that federal officials may be subject to "suits for specific relief," i.e., can be enjoined); Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing plaintiffs to sue state officials to enjoin enforcement 
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The opinions in Bivens 184 and its predecessor, Bell v. Hood, 185 also 
support this approach. As the court in Bell noted, "[I]t has been the 
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their reme-
dies so as to grant the necessary relief."186 The Supreme Court later 
used this same language in Bivens, 187 resting its decision on the notion 
that either the courts or the legislature must remedy deprivations of 
rights in order to effect the constitutional guarantee.188 Because the 
defendant's unconstitutional conduct in Bivens was not ongoing, how-
ever, injunctive relief was not a viable solution. The Court thus 
crafted a new cause of action, a claim for damages, to effect the consti-
tutional guarantee. Effectively, money damages were necessary, "lest 
[the Court] be in dereliction of its fourth amendment duties."189 
A second theory rests on a deterrence model: constitutional rights 
are sufficiently guaranteed where violations are deterred. A statutory 
scheme is constitutionally adequate if it minimizes constitutional dep-
rivations, whether or not the scheme protects the rights of all. Under 
this view, determining the coverage necessary to deter violations is a 
policy consideration best left to Congress.190 The legislature must cal-
culate the level of violations which must be remedied to ensure effec-
tive protection of constitutional guarantees. Once Congress provides 
statutory relief in those cases, however, relief for additional instances 
of constitutional deprivations becomes redundant. No further deter-
rence would result from the creation of a judicial remedy. 
Criticism of the deterrence rationale in the context of the civil ser-
vice takes two forms. First, where Congress fails to protect an entire 
class of individuals, it will fail to deter constitutional deprivations for 
all within that class. Among federal employees, the CSRA denies 
many groups the right to direct Board review of adverse personnel 
actions. The Act charges the OSC to remedy cases where these em-
ployees have suffered prohibited personnel actions, but the Special 
Counsel has repeatedly failed to do so.19 1 Thus, no realistic mecha-
nism exists to deter violations of these employees' rights. Within these 
of an unconstitutional state statute, despite the Eleventh Amendment). In fact, Congress re-
cently recognized this tradition, amending the Administrative Procedures Act to provide that 
suits against federal agencies and employees "seeking relief other than money damages" shall not 
be dismissed because the United States is a party or even the named defendant. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702 (1988). 
184. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163). 
185. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
186. 327 U.S. at 684 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163). 
187. 403 U.S. at 392. 
188. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text. 
189. Schrock & Walsh, supra note 156, at 1136. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 79-90. 
191. See supra text accompanying notes 131-49. 
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groups, all cases of constitutional deprivations slip through the cracks, 
not just a few. 
Second, this theory ignores the fundamental nature of constitu-
tional guarantees. 
Unlike other legal rights created and subject to qualification, modifica-
tion, and limitation by government, constitutional rights derive from a 
higher source than government itself .... [A]bsent a clear statement by 
the People in the Constitution itself, the document should not be read to 
create gaps between right and remedy manipulable by govemment. 192 
Because constitutional guarantees express ideals fundamental to the 
American political system, courts should not consider them as mere 
ordinary factors in balancing policy considerations.193 Individual 
rights are so central to a constitutional government that they must be 
protected in nearly all cases.194 To ensure adequate protection of fed-
eral employee rights, either the courts or the legislature must remedy 
these deprivations. The judicial tradition of providing injunctive relief 
where constitutional principles are threatened recognizes the impor-
tance of these principles. Neither the Eleventh Amendment195 nor the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity196 have prevented federal courts from 
enjoining unconstitutional conduct by government officials. Failure to 
provide necessary protection robs many classes of civil servants of the 
fundamental guarantees of the Constitution. 
B. Necessity of Meaningful Relief Under the CSRA 
Perhaps the individual guarantees of the Constitution do not re-
quire effective protection, thus permitting Congress to obviate all judi-
cial remedies, including equitable relief, without providing meaningful 
alternatives. The courts, however, should not infer such preclusion 
lightly. "Even if the Constitution does not require effective remedies 
for violations of constitutional rights, and even if Congress may strip 
constitutional rights of all meaningful remedies, courts should at least 
ensure that such was Congress' intent before finding legislation to 
192. Amar, supra note 178, at 1491 n.262. 
193. Note, supra note 4, at 1260. 
194. Amar notes the weakness behind the argument that governments might simply be un-
able to afford the cost of full remedies for constitutional violations: 
[D]iscretionary expenditures surely must take a back seat to [relief] mandated by constitu-
tional principles ..•. To argue that government "cannot afford" to guarantee full remedies 
is to argue that the regime of rights that the framers embedded in the Constitution is simply 
unworkable. This is an argument that should be required to bear a very heavy burden of 
proof. 
Amar, supra note 178, at 1491 n.262. 
195. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judi· 
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XI. 
196. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949). 
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[preempt judicial remedies]." 197 As intent is so difficult to gauge,198 
courts may employ two methods to ensure that constitutional guaran-
tees are not deprived of meaningful protection except by congressional 
design. First, courts may demand that congressional intent to pre-
empt traditional judicial remedies be expressed clearly and explicitly 
in the text of the statute itself. 199 In the present case, no such state-
ment exists. Courts have not found the Civil Service Reform Act to 
explicitly preclude equitable remedies.200 The federal judiciary can in-
terpret this silence on the preemption question to sanction equitable 
relief where necessary. 
Second, courts may require the statute to provide meaningful rem-
edies. The judiciary could view ineffective statutory relief as a con-
gressional invitation to create a federal cause of action and enjoin 
unconstitutional conduct where necessary.201 Such an approach 
would prevent courts from denying adequate constitutional protection 
to certain groups merely because Congress failed to include such 
classes within the legislative scheme. In determining if the afforded 
relief suffices, "the fact that persons in other situations may have ac-
cess to remedies that will vindicate their rights under the constitu-
tional provision in question should not preclude the judicial creation 
of remedies for a particular plaintiff who is without effective means of 
redress."202 The federal courts should thus not consider the availabil-
ity of statutory remedies for many classes of federal employees to pre-
empt judicially created equitable relief for those groups denied such 
mechanisms. 
If the statute does not afford the plaintiff a remedy, the court 
should determine independently whether injunctive relief is necessary 
to effect the constitutional guarantee. Courts should not assume that 
the legislative scheme is constitutionally adequate for all individuals, 
for 
[t]o merely assume the constitutional adequacy of an "exclusive" statu-
tory remedy is to permit Congress to deny an individual all remedy be-
cause he fails to state a statutory claim or cannot meet mere statutory 
defenses. That would amount to allowing Congress to define what con-
stitutes a violation of particular guarantees in the Bill of Rights, when 
the function of defining constitutional violations is properly the Court's 
197. Note, supra note 4, at 1260. 
198. See supra section I.B. 
199. See supra section I.B.1. 
200. See Spagnola II, 859 F.2d at 229-30; Perry v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 484, 484-85 (11th Cir. 
1988); Hubbard v. E.P.A., 809 F.2d l, 11 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Courts finding preemption 
premise their conclusions on the effectiveness of the available remedies, see supra section I.B.2, or 
the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme. See supra section I.B.3. 
201. Note, supra note 4, at 1260-61; see also Steinman, supra note 159, at 283 n.81; supra 
section I.B.2. 
202. Dellinger, supra note 170, at 1551. 
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under Marbury v. Madison. 203 
Essentially, denying federal courts the power to review the sufficiency 
of legislative schemes would subvert a central function of the judiciary 
under the separation of powers doctrine: to serve as a check on other 
branches of government.204 
If the statute provides relief for the plaintiff, the court should as-
sess the sufficiency of protection. Of central concern is that the statute 
afford more than just symbolic relief; the remedy must be truly com-
pensatory to ensure that the constitutional guarantee is not rendered a 
"mere form of words."205 An important factor is whether the plaintiff 
was permitted meaningful access to the legislative remedies. 206 
Unreasonable procedural hurdles or breakdowns in the statutory proce-
dural system due to human frailties can prevent an aggrieved person 
from attaining a statutory remedy .... [S]uch procedural obstacles might 
be regarded as bearing upon the adequacy of the statutory remedy on the 
theory that, absent meaningful access, the legislated remedies cannot be 
adequate, no matter how satisfactory they would be if available.201 
The failure of the Office of the Special Counsel to investigate allega-
tions of prohibited personnel practices vigorously and to protect fed-
eral employee rights208 operates as a "procedural obstacle," rendering 
inadequate the remedies theoretically available to probationers and 
similarly situated federal employees.209 In such cases, judicial inter-
vention may be warranted. If the court determines that an exclusive 
statutory remedy sufficiently protects constitutional rights, however, 
the court should refrain from interfering. Such a legislative provision 
furnishes the minimum protection that the Constitution requires. 
C. A Role for Judicially Created Equitable Remedies 
The Civil Service Reform Act does not clearly and explicitly pre-
empt equitable relief for deprivations of federal employees' constitu-
tional rights.210 Courts which infer legislative intent to preclude 
premise their decisions on the effectiveness of available remedies211 or 
the comprehensive nature of the remedial scheme.212 The latter 
203. Steinman, supra note 159, at 282-83. 
204. Fallon, supra note 175, at 975-76. 
205. Steinman, supra note 159, at 284. 
206. See id. at 283. 
207. Id. at 284. 
208. See supra section 11.C. 
209. See Steinman, supra note 159, at 284. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 57-67. Nor do two new acts which modify the 
CSRA, the Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (1990) 
(codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 7511 (West Supp. 1992)), and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at scattered sections of5 U.S.C.A. (West. Supp. 
1992)), appear to contain an explicit declaration of preemption. 
211. See supra section I.B.2. 
212. See supra section I.B.3. 
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group, by focusing only on the completeness of the statutory plan and 
not the adequacy of provided relief, risks exposing many federal em-
ployees to unremedied constitutional deprivations. 
Courts that decline to examine the effectiveness of statutory reme-
dies typically rely on two arguments, both based on congressional in-
tent. Some courts assert that judicial recognition of an equitable cause 
of action "would be an attempt to improve on Congress' judgment."213 
Others reason that a grant of judicial protection would upset the deli-
cate balance Congress struck in designing the civil service. 214 Both 
arguments rely on the unproven assumptions that Congress intended 
federal employees to have access only to CSRA remedies and that 
Congress weighed and balanced the competing concerns and afforded 
constitutional rights the sole protection they deserved.215 Congress' 
only express purpose in enacting the CSRA, however, was to provide 
the nation with an effective, high quality civil service system;216 at-
tempts by these courts to infer other intentions are problematic. Leg-
islative intent is an amorphous concept, capable of manipulation to 
yield nearly any desired conclusion.217 Courts should not sacrifice the 
constitutional rights of civil servants through a speculative interpreta-
tion of the CSRA. Congress may have the power to withdraw judicial 
relief where its purpose to do so is clear, but not where it expresses no 
view on the issue.218 Courts should decline a cause of action only 
where Congress views the alternative remedy as equally effective in 
enforcing the Constitution, and the displaced judicial remedy is no 
longer necessary to effect the constitutional guarantee.219 Under Biv-
ens and its successors, the federal government or agency involved 
should have the burden of proving the alternative remedial scheme is 
constitutionally sufficient in the instant case.220 
Lower courts agree that Bush v. Lucas and Schweiker v. Chi/icky 
213. Note, supra note 4, at 1266. 
214. See id. 
215. Id. In fact, an atnicus curiae brief submitted in the Bush case by several primary spon-
sors of the CSRA explicitly states that Congress did not intend to preclude Bivens remedies by 
enacting the legislation. See Devine & Aplin, supra note 125, at 63. There exists no way of 
ascertaining if this reflects the intent of all members of Congress. 
216. 5 u.s.c. § 1101 (1988). 
217. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REv. 395 (1950). 
218. Note, supra note 4, at 1260-61. 
219. Dellinger, supra note 170, at 1549. 
220. The constitutional cause of action is defeated where the "defendant[] show[s] that Con-
gress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recov-
ery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 
14, 18 (1980); see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Natned Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Clearly, the federal 
agency or government will be the defendant where a federal employee alleges a constitutional 
deprivation. 
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preclude a Bivens claim for damages by a federal employee.221 They 
disagree, however, on whether these decisions also preempt injunctive 
relief. 222 The importance of traditional equitable principles to the pro-
tection of constitutional guarantees militates against preclusion. 
The courts' power to impose equitable remedies against agencies is 
broader than its power to impose legal remedies against individuals. Biv-
ens actions are a recent judicial creation and comparatively easy for Con-
gress to preempt. The court's power to enjoin unconstitutional acts by 
the government, however, is inherent in the Constitution itself.223 
In fact, Bush and Schweiker may be wholly inapplicable to situa-
tions where equitable remedies are sought. Both cases addressed the 
availability of money' damages, a form of relief which Bivens itself rec-
ognized as subject to congressional discretion.224 No mention was 
made of the traditional power of the federal judiciary to enjoin uncon-
stitutional conduct by government officials.225 Injunctive relief likely 
remains a viable solution for federal employees who have seen their 
constitutional rights trampled. Reinstatement, orders to promote, and 
expungement of unfavorable evaluations are positive methods courts 
can use to restore and protect constitutional guarantees.226 Where 
statutory remedies are inadequate, as they currently are under the 
CSRA,227 such judicial methods are vitally important. 
Judicial provision of a cause of action for civil servants who are 
insufficiently protected by statutory remedies may also improve the 
overall efficiency of the civil service. Employee reluctance to disclose 
waste and fraud228 may be costing U.S. taxpayers millions of dol-
lars.229 If federal employees, regardless of their classification under 
the CSRA, are guaranteed that their constitutional right to free speech 
will protect them, individuals may be more likely to "blow the whis-
tle" on improper and illegal behavior within government. Such expo-
sures can lead to effective streamlining of the civil service system. The 
Whistleblower Protection Act recognized this benefit by guaranteeing 
Board review for whistleblowers; however, procedural obstacles pre-
vent the Act from providing swift and efficient redress for constitu-
tional violations.230 Judicial intervention could improve the remedial 
221. See, e.g., Spagnola II, 859 F.2d at 226-29. 
222. See supra note 10. 
223. Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d I, 11 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
224. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
225. See Hubbard, 809 F.2d at 11 n.15. 
226. Of course, personal conflicts in the workplace, especially following a lawsuit, may 
render such relief ineffective. Courts are able to evaluate the mitigating factors, however, and 
suggest a workable solution. 
227. See supra section 11.C. 
228. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
229. 1983 Hearing, supra note 132, at 3 (statement of Senator Howell Heflin). 
230. See supra note 119. 
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process by enjoining an adverse action at least until the Board has a 
chance to review the case. 
Equitable relief through the courts may also improve operating ef-
ficiency by providing increased protections to nonwhistleblowers. 
Federal agencies make considerable investments when they search for, 
hire, and train employees - investments which may be lost when em-
ployees are fired, denied promotions, or adversely criticized for rea-
sons unrelated to ability. Effective protection of employee 
constitutional rights protects these investments by supporting the 
merit system. Furthermore, it may make the federal government more 
attractive as an employer, enticing better workers into the fold. 
CONCLUSION 
Adequate protection of the constitutional rights of federal employ-
ees requires that courts have the power to furnish injunctive relief 
where necessary. Deficiencies in the current civil service remedial 
scheme render statutory remedies ineffective or nonexistent in many 
situations, leaving specific classes of federal employees without consti-
tutional protections. Courts must be willing to step in to provide the 
necessary relief. The judiciary, therefore, should interpret the Civil 
Service Reform Act to preempt judicially created equitable remedies 
only where the government or agency demonstrates that the statutory 
remedial scheme is constitutionally sufficient in the immediate case. 
In most cases, this test will be met. But where constitutional safe-
guards are left to the discretion of individuals committed to the effi-
ciency of the civil service and not to the protection of employee rights, 
the grant of discretion may be abused. In these cases, civil servants 
must be able to seek equitable relief through the federal courts, or their 
constitutional rights may be rendered meaningless. 
